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JERRY GREEN AND CHARLES M. KAHN
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers'
earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms'
.superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of
contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such aj^reements will cause em-
ployment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk.
ll is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk-neutral, employment is
always ahoue the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot,
therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing
between workers and a risk-neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric informa-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most labor agreements specify the relationship between total
compensation and level of employment, but leave the latter under the
firm's control. Sucb a provision for contract governance may be nec-
essary because information about the value of the firm's short-run
production is not easily perceived and verified by labor. This asym-
metry sets up a potential conflict between the goals of risk-sharing
and productive efficiency. In this paper we attempt to analyze the
solution to tbis problem by looking at some properties of the labor
contracts tbat are optimal in a model where the firm will choose the
employment level after it ascertains some relevant random parame-
ters.
The results can be roughly characterized as follows, subject of
course to assumptions whose innocence and plausibility we shall later
espouse:
1. There is more employment fluctuation under the optimal
contract than would be observed if employment were chosen to
maximize profits subject to the constraint that worker's utility be beld
constant in all situations. There is less income fluctuation.
2. Tbere is less employment fluctuation and more income fluc-
tuation tban in tbe contract that would be implemented if all infor-
mation could be directly verified by both parties.
3. The level of employment realized is in all cases one of "in-
voluntary overtime." If workers could recontract with tbe firm ex post
under conditions of symmetric information, the level of employment
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would be lower. In other words, the value of the marginal product of
labor is always less tban workers' marginal valuation of their lei-
sure.
4. Finally, although levels of employment are higher and firms
are more profitable in states in which labor is more productive,
workers' utility will be monotonically decreasing in the firm's prof-
itability. "Good times" are not shared by all.
These results show that tbe asymmetry of information tbat has
been suggested as a source of suboptimal employment policies results
in the opposite bias. It cannot be used as a foundation for a theory of
involuntary unemployment.
Risk sharing between firm and worker has been a central focus
of the literature on implicit contracts.' In addition to a random
profitability of firms, other features treated in various papers include
private rather than common knowledge of this random fluctuation,
risk aversion by firms as well as by workers, income effects in the
demand for leisure, and random parameters in workers' utility
functions as well as in firms' profit functions. Tbe maintained as-
sumptions of this paper are as follows:
1. Workers are risk-averse, and firms are risk-neutral.
2. Firms have complete control of employment, ex post, because
tbe information about their profitability is not publicly available.
3. The worker's welfare is represented by a single collective
utility function, as if a union with well-specified risk preferences were
to strike the bargaining agreement. Tbe actual implementation of the
agreements within the group of workers—^for example, seniority rules
and the wage structure for different categories of workers—^is not
addressed.
4. The preferences of labor are assumed nonstochastic over the
life of the contract. The relevant uncertainty affects only tbe value
of the firm's output.
5. Finally, the form of feasible contracts is highly simplified.
Compensation can be made to depend only upon the firm's contem-
poraneous choice of employment. More complicated arrangements
in which compensation is allowed to depend upon the duration of
unemployment, for example, are not considered.
These assumptions characterize the structure of the model. The
qualitative result of overemployment will be the byproduct of the
positive income effect on leisure.
1. We cannot attempt any reasonable summary of this interesting and rapidly
expanding literature here. The papers most closely related to this one are Pheips-Calvo
[19771 and Hall-Lilien [19791, Their results are discussed below. An excellent survey
of the research on implicit contracts is Azariadis [1979], He mentions the problem
treated here on pp. 28-30.WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 175
The model is presented in Section II. The main results are de-
rived in Section III. In Section IV we offer some intuitive remarks and
I ompare our results to those obtained under different specifications.
We also briefly examine the relation of this problem to models from
the principal-agent and the optimal-taxation literatures.
IL THE MODEL
The relevant uncertainty is parameterized by 6, and affects only
the value of the firm's output. If / is tbe employment level, then f(l,O)
is tbis value. The contract specifies tbe wage paid w{l) as a function
of employment. Tbe net payoff to the firm is thus/(^f*) — lw(l). With
the relevant uncertainty present in tbis general form, it is hard to
derive specific results. Therefore, we shall treat the special case of
multiplicative uncertainty,
(2.1) f{i,d) = egii), . , .
where g is an increasing concave function, and ^ is a positive random
variable with a positive continuous density over an interval. Tbe firm
is assumed to be risk-neutral, and tberefore maximizing tbe mathe-
matical expectation oidg{l) — lw(,l) is its objective.
Workers' utility is an increasing function of earnings Iwil) and
a decreasing function of the level of employment. Because workers
are risk-averse, we write their objective as
(2.2) Euilw{l),l),
where u is a concave function. The expectation in (2.2) is taken with
respect to the distribution of /. However, / is chosen by firms. Its
distribution will therefore depend on the form of the entire contract
and on p{0), tbe probability density of f*.
Under any contract w{l) in any state 0, the firm chooses the level
of employment ({(I) and pays the associated wage w{l{0)). It isnota-
tionally simpler to work with total compensation than with the wage
rate; thus we define - . ^ •
(2.3)
The problem is to choose w{-) so as to maximize
(2.4) ' ' "
subject to
(2.5)176 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
wbere i{6) is defined by the solution to
(2.6) .. . meixf{l,d)-lw{lh
I
and r{B) is given by (2.3). By varying c parametrically, tbe family ol'
efficient contracts will be delineated.
We shall examine the characteristics of solutions to this problem
and show tbat overemployment is the typical outcome. By comparing
our solution witb solutions to related problems, we shall ascertain
some of tbe qualitative implications of informational asymmetry and
differential attitudes toward risk. Specifically we ask whether and
to wbat extent profits, employment, and labor compensation are more
stable in this problem than when these features are absent.
Before proceeding farther, let us look at three simpler versions
of this problem that will be useful as benchmarks.
First, consider tbe maximization of (2.4) subject to (2.5), but
wbere 1{B) can be chosen arbitrarily. This corresponds to that part of
tbe implicit contracts literature in which the realization of uncer-
tainties can be verified by both parties and therefore can be used
explicitly to condition the outcomes.
In this case the solution can be characterized by the two equa-
tions.
(2.7) -B
(2.8) uMe),m) = K, a constant.
The former is tbe condition for productive efficiency. That is, in ail
states d, marginal productivity of an extra unit of labor is equal to the
marginal disutility of that unit. The latter equation is the condition
for efficiency in risk-bearing (Borch's equation wbere one of the two
parties is risk-neutral).
Next, we can consider the original problem in the case wben
utility takes the particular form,
(2.9) u{r,l) = v{r - h{l)),
where h is an increasing function describing tbe marginal disutility
of labor and v is an arbitrary increasing concave function. The utility
functions (2.9) are precisely those in which the income elasticity of
leisure demanded (or labor supplied) is zero.
Hall and Lilien [1979] studied implicit contracting under (2.9)
in the case when u is linear. The solution they found applies to the case
of concave v is linear. The solution they found applies to the case ofWAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 177
concave u as well. It is to set iv{) and thus r( ) so as to implicitly de-
scribe an indifference curve; tbat is.
(2.10) ril)-h(i) = u.
It is easy to see why the firm's solution to its problem automati-
cally satisfies (2.8). Regardless of the choice of /, (2.10) gueirantees that
(2.8) will hold because the argument of i;(-) is fixed.
The firm's choices in each state will also automatically satisfy
ihe productive efficiency condition. For this particular utility func-
tion, condition (2.7) becomes
(2.11) Og'il) = h'(l).
In eacb state the firm chooses tbe point of r(/) such that the marginal
cost of hiring labor is just equal to the marginal revenue product.
Tbus,
(2.12) dg'il) = r'{l). -
And from (2.10), since u is constant along the contract, we have
(2.13) r'il) = h'{l).
C'ombining (2.12) and (2.13), we see that the profit-maximizing choice
is invariably the productively efficient choice.
This same argument can be sbown graphically. Figures Ia and
Ib show tbe firm's isoprofit curves for two different values of fl and
specify a particular contract r{l). Profits increase to the southeast.
Points A, A' are the profit-maximizing points, satisfying condition
(2.12). For a profit-maximizing firm to choose the productively effi-
cient points, this requires that the slope of tbe contract always be
equal to the worker's marginal rate of substitution. In other words,
FIGURE Ia FIGURE IbQUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
u should be constant along r{l). Efficiency in risk-bearing requires
tbat Ur should be constant along r{l). For utility functions of the form
(2.9), there is no conflict between productive efficiency and risk-
sharing, and thus, no loss due to the private nature of observation of
B. Witb constant Ur no further income smoothing is desirable; thus
there is nothing to be gained from further insurance by tbe firm. With
efficient production in all periods, tbere is no Pareto-improvement
to be had from recontracting.^
For the first-best contract to be incentive-compatible, utility
functions must be of the form (2.9). Our final example is a simple in-
stance of wbat can go wrong when (2.9) does not hold.
Suppose that tbe worker's utility function is additively sepa-
rable:
(2.14) . uir,l) = m{r) - nil),
with m(-) concave and ni-) convex. Now condition (2.8) becomes
(2.15) . m'ir) = K.
In other words, in this case the optimal contract would involve paying
the worker a fixed amount in all states of the world. The labor required
should vary smoothly according to
(2.16) K/n'iD^Og'il),
which is tbe version of condition (2.7) for this particular utility
function. It is easy to see that tbis contract could not be enforced
under differential information. Because the contract does not provide
for any variation in salary witb respect to working time, the firm would
always require the maximal amount of labor.
In subsequent sections of the paper we shall examine the general
solution to the problem when (2.9) does not hold and when, in par-
ticular, tbe income elasticity of leisure demanded is positive rather
than zero. As this third example indicates, in such problems (2.7) and
(2.8), the risk-sharing and productive efficiency conditions, wili be
in conflict. Thus, devising a contract that can be implemented despite
differential information will be a second-best problem. Its solution
will entail overemployment for all 6 (except the highest and lowest
possible values, where efficiency will bold).
2. Hall and Lilien also consider the consequences of random effects in the utility
function. In this case they show that a contract administered by firms cannot implement
the full-information optimum even when utility functions are of the form shown in
equation (2.9), •• ..WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 179
III. SOLUTION
The method of solution to be used below is novel in models of
implicit contracting, drawing heavily on some techniques first de-
veloped in the literature on incentive compatibility and optimal
auction design.''
The idea is to regard the problem as the choice of two functions
of 0, r(^) and HO), instead of the single relation w{l). Thus, we
have
(3.1) max Eu{rid),m)
subject to
(3.2) Edgnm-m-^c
and that, for each d,
(3.3) max QgHCO)) - r{h occurs at ^ = 0.
h
The second set of constraints corresponds to (2.6).
It is clear that given any solution of the original problem, we can
define r{0) and l{ii) by the values these variables actually take on for
each value of fl, and tben r{O),l(O) will solve (3.1)-(3.3). Conversely,
if we can arrange for a "trutbtelling" solution r{d),l{6) to (3.1)-(3.3),
then the implicit relation,
(3.4) r(/) = r(/-i(/)),
where/"'(/) isthe value of 0 such that/(^^) = /, gives us a solution to
the original problem. It must only be insured that this inverse is well
defined. We shall see helow that this is not a problem because any
solution to (3.1)-(3.3) will satisfy
(3.5) I'iB) > 0
by virtue of the second-order conditions necessary for (3.3) to
hold.-*
3. See Wilson (1977) and Riley and Samuelson [ 1979|, for an introduction to the
auction design problem. Stochastic auction designs have been treated by Maskin, Riley,
and Weitzman [1979[. On incentive compatibilily see Green and Laffont |1979l and
Laffont and Maskin [1980], where the treatment of the continuous-parameter problem
is closest to what will be used here.
4. There is no a priori reason to restrict contracts w(l) to functions; for some
problems correspondence might work better. Furthermore, two contracts u'lil) and
tv^ih that differ only on portions wbich are never chosen in any state are to all intents
and purposes equivalent. Thus, in cases (unlike tbe present one) where there is not an
exact equivalence between tbe ii (/) formulation and the {w(ff),l(O)) formulation, it
would seem that it is the latter that is the more fundamental specification.180 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The next step is to replace (3.3) by the statement that the first-
and second-order conditions for that problem hold as identities in 0
at6 = e. These are
(3.6) .- • dg'mwm - r'id) = 0
and
(3.7) dg''{m) {i'{d))2 + eg'mwm - r^o) < o.
Since (3.6) is an identity in 6, we can differentiate it to obtain an ex-
pression for r"{6). Substituting this in (3.7), we can rewrite the sec-
ond-order conditions as
or simply I'id) > 0 by the monotonicity of ^. In this way we see that
(3.5) is automatically satisfied, and can be dropped as an explicit
constraint in the maximization.
The problem we solve is to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2) and
(3.6).'' To simplify subsequent calculations, we let
(3.8) • .
and
(3.9) '•• v{r,y) =
In this notation the problem is
(3.10) max Ev{r,y)
subject to . , ' . .•
(3.11) ' ^' E\ey-r\^c
(3.12) ey-r' = O for all ^.
Because v is concave and because the restrictions are linear, the
first-order conditions and the transversality conditions are sufficient
for a maximum (see Ewing [1969], pp. 129-31).
5. For the purposes of this exposition, we are siniply assuming that the constraint
(3.5) is nowhere binding. A complete solution, taking this constraint into account is
considerably messier. Such a solution will be composed of two types of subportions.
In regions of B over which (3.5) is not binding, the contract will continue to satisfy
equations of the form of (3.14)-(3.16). In regions in which (3.5) is binding, both / and
r wili be constant. The resultant contract curves will be similar to those described in
the text, but they will be kinked at certain points. The conclusions we derive will not
be affected. We are aiso ignoring the possibility of discontinuous contract curves. It
turns out that having income a normal good is sufficient for a continuous contract to
be optimal. These issues will be discussed more fully in a subsequent paper.WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 181
Writing the Lagrangian expression,
(3.13) ("p{e)virid),ym) + f{e){r'{e) - eym .y.
+ p{e)k{dy{e)-r{O)-c)de,
we obtain the first-order conditions,
(3.14)
(3.15) p{e){.Vy + kB)-^-~ (-f'd) = -df - f
do
(3.16) r'-»y = O;
and the transversality conditions,
(3.17) /(a)=/(6) = 0
(3.18) -fia)a =-/(6)6 ^ 0,
where a and b are the endpoints of the support of the distribution of
p{0). Under reasonable smoothness assumptions (including dif-
ferentiability of p), these equations will yield unique continuous,
smooth solutions /( ), g{), r{). Expressions (3.14) and (3.15)
can be combined to yield
(3.19) i;v + t-,^) + //p = O.
As efficiency requires that v^. + VrO = 0, the bias of employment away
from the efficient level depends solely on the sign of the function /.
If/ > 0, we have overemployment: tbe value of the marginal product
of labor Og' fails short of the rate at which labor must be compensated
on the margin —ui/ur- By definition, ui/ur = Vyg'/vr and thus / > 0
implies that fv + ^r^ < 0, or,
Bg' < -Ui/Ur.
We now turn to a proof of this main result—that indeed / > 0,
except at a and b where / = 0, and thus that overemployment always
obtains.
Differentiating (3.14) with respect to 6, we have
using (3.16) and (3.14),182 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
using (3.19),
(3.20)
pVrr
pv
•
Vy
l^r ,
+ Vry
1
Vrr ,
+ P'-
p
The condition that leisure demand be a normal good is just
(3.21) {Urr{-UilUr) + Url)<(i.
Since Urr = Vrr, U( = Vyg\ Uri = Vry g', and g' > 0, the first two bracketed
terms above can be signed by this assumption:
(3.22) p(Vrr i-Vy/Vr) + Vry) < 0.
If/ < 0, the third term in the brackets and thus the entire bracketed
expression is negative. Moreover, y' > 0. Thus, we know that if
(3.23) /" < p'f'/p.
We now prove that assuming / < 0 in the interior of [a ,b] leads
to a contradiction. Suppose that / < 0 for some value in (a,b). Then
/ must attain a local minimum at some point x * in the interior, with
/(x*) < 0. At that point/'(JT*) = 0 and f"ix*) > 0. But this contradicts
(3.23). Thus, / s 0, and in particular, / > 0 for all 0 in the interior of
[a,b]. A corollary is that u decreases as 6 increases along the con-
tract.
The function / can also be used to derive information about Ur
along the contract. From (3.14) we know that Vr=f' + K, and we can
show that K - Evr. Since we know from the above theorem that
f'ia) >0and/'(6) < 0, these relations are sufficient to sbow that for
0 near aur is greater than its average value and for 0 near bur is less
than its average value.^
IV. INTUITION AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER RESULTS
The discussion above has been quite abstract, yet the intuition
behind the overemployment result is actually very clear. Figure II
represents the utility function of workers, increasing to the northwest.
The curve u is an indifference curve, and Ur is a constant marginal
utility of income locus. When leisure is a normal good, Ur must have
6. If we knew that /" were less than zero everywhere, we could easily show that
Ur declines along the entire length of the contract. But this need not hold in general,
and so the claim can only be made near the endpoints.WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 183
FIGURE II
a smaller slope (algebraically) than u. Moving northeastward along
U, the marginal utility of income declines.
If u were implemented as the contract, we would always have
productive efficiency, but Ur would not be constant. The first-best
contract would lie along u^; but if we left it to a profit-maximizing firm
to implement Ur as a contract, we would have efficiency in risk bearing,
but not in production. The firm would profit maximize hy setting
marginal product equal to the slope of the contract not of the indif-
ference curve. Because of the relationship between these two slopes,
the level of employment is too high under the Ur contract.
The solution to our problem C will produce a compromise be-
tween U and Ur-" But, as this will still be less than u, it will still be
characterized by overemployment for all 0.
We can now justify claims (1) and (2) of the introduction. First,
let us compare the optimal contract C with any constant utility con-
tract whose path it crosses, as shown in Figure III. Let A and B be the
locus of points (r,/) such thai Ur/ui = a and 6, respectively. As long
as leisure is a normal good, these curves move leftward with increases
in utility. We know from the transversality conditions that under
contract C the endpoints are on these loci. Similarly, in a constant
utility contract, since productive efficiency is achieved at all times,
the firm's choices at ^i = a and 0 = b also lie on these loci. Thus, when
leisure is a normal good, the spread between l(b) and l{a) is greater
in the optimal contract than in the constant utility contract.
When income is a normal good (so that A and B move upward
with increases in u, as they do in Figure III), then a similar argument
7. If/" ia always negative, tben the slope of the optimal contract at any point lies
between the slopes of the u curve and of the Ur curve tbrough that point.184 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE III
demonstrates that r{b) — r(a) is smaller in the optimal contract than
in the constant utility contract.
Because Ur is not necessarily monotonic, we cannot make quite
as general a claim for arbitrary Ur crossed by the optimal contract, but
we can make an analogous argument if we stick to the locus of constant
Ur at a value equal to Eur along the contract curve.
Compare the second-best optimal contract and its associated Eur
level with a first-best contract at which Ur is identically equal to this
Eur. Efficiency once again guarantees that the endpoints of the con-
tract lie on A and B. And from the conclusions of the previous section,
we know that the contract C must start with a higher Ur at a and end
with a lower Ur at b. Thus, if leisure is a normal good, the variation
of employment is greater along the first-best than along the second-
best contract. If income is a normal good, the variation of income is
less along the first-best than along the second-best. (See Figure
IV.)
In the papers by Grossman and Hart [1981] and Azariadis [1983],
underemployment is shown to be the rule. These papers use the no-
FlGURE IVWAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 185
FIGURE V
income-effect utility function but introduce risk aversion on the part
of firms. The same diagram, reproduced here as Figure V, is useful
to explain these results. Now U and Ur coincide. But efficiency in
risk-bearing requires Ur/(})' to be constant, where 0' is the marginal
utility of profit. Profit is increasing in 0, and l'{0) > 0, so we know that
(/»' will be decreasing as we move northeastward along the contract.
To keep Ur/0' constant, Ur must decrease with / as well. This means
that the locus where Ur/(t>' is constant must cut Ur from below. A
contract with Ur/<t>' constant is thus one with underemployment.
Combining both goals in the second-best problem will still produce
underemployment.
This seems to be the appropriate point at which to relate this
model to the principal-agent literature and to the problem of optimal
income taxation. In our problem the "agent" is the firm who has
proprietary information. With a risk-neutral agent we expect full
efficiency to be feasible. But here, the "effort" of the agent, choosing
/, enters directly into the principal's welfare and not only indirectly
through its influence on "output," which here is total revenue to be
shared {OgiHO)}). It is this composition of an externality problem with
an incentive problem that gives the model its second-best char-
acter.
Comparison with the optimal income tax literature is more dif-
ficult.'^ There are, indeed, many more similarities than differences.
If we think of ft as distinguishing various types of individuals according
to their productivity, then the optimal tax problem is to find a
scbedule of taxes to maximize
Su(r,l)dd such that E\Ol~r]>C.
8. Mirrlees [1971,1979|. Our use of the transversality condition mirrors the in-
vestigation hy Seade 11977],186 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Here r is net income, and so 61 — r is tax received from individuals of
type 6.
The firm in our problem under different circumstances 0 is like
the workers in an optimal income tax problem with different levels
of ability. The constraint of keeping workers' expected utility above
a fixed level corresponds to the constraint of raising a fixed amount
of revenue from the income tax. The firm's choice of / along a fixed
(r,l) schedule is like the workers' choice of / when faced with a fixed
relation between before- and after-tax income.
In the taxation literature there is no direct way of observing the
individual's type, and thus tax functions must rely on charging ac-
cording to observable characteristics. This creates an incentive
problem analogous to the one we have discussed. We must allow the
firm to choose its preferred combination of w and / in each state along
the contract given it; the government presents a tax schedule to its
citizens and then must allow the individuals each to choose tbe level
of work and net income they prefer along it.
Thus, the problems are extremely close formally. Where then are
the differences? What is the special structure of our problem that
causes overemployment to result? Why is this result sensitive to the
income elasticity of leisure demand; whereas it is the price elasticity
that determines the departure of optimal income taxation from the
first-best of lump-sum taxation of ability?
The details of the optimal tax problem differ because the pa-
rameters that are controlled by the schedule are different: In the tax
system the schedule specifies net income not as a function of hours
worked /, but as a function of gross income wl. This single difference
is sufficient to make the tax problem sensitive not to the income
elasticity of leisure, but to the price elasticity of leisure.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its beginnings, the implicit contracts literature has had the
explanation of unemployment and wage rigidity as its goal. Tbe in-
tention was to offer a structure under which wage rigidity is optimal,
and in which unemployment follows as a result. To some extent, these
goals were achieved, but, it is safe to say, always by introducing some
special features in the contracting process that were not obviously an
essential part of the model. For example, a common device is a two-
period structure in which the contract operates somewhat differently
in the second period than in the first.WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 187
In tbis paper we have given what we believe to be the first results
using the implicit contracts theme that does not rely on any of these
structural C{)nditions. Paradoxically, the interaction of differential
risk aversion and incomplete information is precisely the opposite of
the original intention. Long-term relationships between employers
and workers increase employment variability, resulting in more em-
ployment that would be ex post efficient when profitability conditions
are adverse. Thus, the implicit contracts theory may not yield the
underpinnings for a theory of macroeconomic fluctuations.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
I'NIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
RB^FERENCES
Azariadis, C, "Implicit Contracts and Related Topics: A Survey," CARESS Working
Paper, No. 79-17. 1979.
—^, "Employment with Asymmetric Information," this Journal, Supplement,
XCVIII (198:1), 157-72.
Ewing. G. M., Calculus of Variations with AppUcatic)n.-i (N.Y.: Norton, 1%9).
(ireen, J., and J.-J. Laffont. Incentives in Public Decision-Making (Amsterdam:
North Holland. 1979).
(Ira^isman, S., and O. Hart. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment,"
American Economic Review, LXXI (1981), 301-01.
Hall, R., and D. M. Lilien, "Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and
Demand." American Economic Review, LXIX (1979), 868-79.
Intriligator. M., Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory (Englewood Cliffs,
N.I; Prentice Hall, 1971).
Laffont, J.-J., and E. Maakin, "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy
Mechanisms," Econumetrica, XLVIII (1980), 1507-20.
Maskin. E., J. Riley, and M. Weitzman. "Optimal Stochastic Auctions." mimeographed,
M.I.T., 1979.
Mirrlees, J. A., "An Exploration in theTheory of Optimum Income Taxation," fteyiei*
of Economic Studies, XXXVIII (1971), 175-208.
. "The Theory of Optimum Taxation," in Handbook of Mathematical Economics,
K. Arrow and M. D. IntrHigator, eds. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979).
Phelps. E. S., and G. Calvo, Appendix to "Indexation Issues," in Stabilization of the
Domestic and International Economy. K. Brunnerand A. H. Meltzer, eds., Car-
negie-Rochester Conference Series .)^t5 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977).
liiley, J., and W. Samuelson, "Optimal Auctions." mimeographed, M.I.T., 1979.
Seade, J., "On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules," Journal of Public Economics,
Vll (1977).20;i-:!6.
Wilson, R. W., "A Ridding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic
Studies, XLIV (1977), 511-18.